Assessment of Bottom-up Budgeting: FY 2015 Cycle

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Presentation to the Quo Vadis Citizen Participation Conference
5 August 2015
Overview of presentation

✓ Background/ objective of study

▪ Findings

▪ Conclusions
Description of BUB

- Launched in March 2012 in time for the preparation of the 2013 National Expenditure Program (NEP) with DBM-DILG-DSWD-NAPC JMC 2012-1

  - Two-fold objective
    - Promote more participatory planning and budgeting processes at national and local level with genuine involvement of grassroots organizations and communities
    - Ensure funding for projects identified by 609 targeted poor LGUs in their Local Poverty Reduction Action Plans (LPRAPs) are included in the budgets of participating national government agencies (NGAs)
Objectives of study

- To examine how the key steps in the planning and prioritization of projects under the BUB for the FY 2015 cycle (as provided under JMC 3-2013) are implemented on the ground in terms of:
  - Extent of CSO participation in BUB
  - LGU-CSO engagement
  - Integration of BUB process in local planning process

- To report on the progress and identify bottlenecks in the implementation of sub-projects identified during the FY 2013 BUB process

- To provide insights on areas for further improvement for the subsequent rounds

* Assessment is focused on process rather than results
Coverage

Municipalities covered

- Agusan del Norte
  - Butuan City (urban) *
  - Buenavista (rural non-KC) *
  - Las Nieves (rural KC) *
- Camarines Sur
  - Goa (urban) *
  - Lagonoy (rural non-KC) *
  - Libmanan (rural KC)
- Negros Occidental
  - Sagay City (urban)
  - Hinigaran (rural non-KC)
  - Cauayan (rural KC)
- Quezon
  - Gumaca (urban)
  - Mauban (rural non-KC)
  - San Antonio (rural KC)

* Municipalities covered in assessment conducted by IPC (Ateneo) for FY 2013 BUB cycle
Overview of presentation

- Background/ objective of study
- Findings
- Conclusions
### Extent of CSO participation

#### Summary indicator of CSO participation – share of projects identified by CSOs/ BDC VCs in total cost of LPRAP projects for FY 2015

#### Variation in share of CSO/ BDC-VC in total cost of LPRAP projects – due to differences in more intermediate indicators of CSO participation (including local political interference in a number of elements of areas)

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* Includes 6,500,000 for water project that was jointly identified by CSO and LGU
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation (in BUB process)

1. Inclusiveness of CSO assembly

2. Quality of CSO participation in CSO assembly
   - Representatives of CSOs which attended CSO assembly
   - Extent of CSO participation in CSO Assembly
   - Selection of CSO reps in LPRAT and CSO signatories
   - Quality of Poverty Situation Analysis – what is output of PSA?
     Application of evidenced-based planning

3. Quality of output of LPRAP workshop
   - Provenance of long list of projects considered
   - Who participated in prioritization?
   - How was project prioritization done?
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

1. Inclusiveness of CSO assembly
   - Who were invited/ How invitations were made
     - Open – notice posted in conspicuous place (e.g., Buenavista);
     - Restrictive – only LGU-accredited CSOs given formal letter of invitations (CamSur, Hinigaran, Cauayan, Mauban)
     - Semi-open –
       - invitations issued to LG-accredited CSOs but remained “open” to others (e.g., Butuan)
       - invitation issued to both LGU-accredited and NGA-accredited CSOs but not to all (e.g., Sagay, Gumaca)

N.B. Different views on inclusion of CSOs which are not accredited by LGU
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

1. Inclusiveness of CSO assembly
   - Non-attendance of invited CSOs (non-attendance rate is as low as 43%)
     - Lack of transportation money
     - Need to earn income on part of CSO rep
     - Conflict with other meetings – has to do with when invitation was issued
     - Lack of interest in LGU matters
       - Trust issues between CSO and LGU
       - Self selection based on political affiliation (e.g., Buenavista)
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

2. Quality of participation of CSO assembly
   • Representatives of CSOs which attended CSO assembly
     o Some sectors are “over-represented” e.g., TODA
     o Absence of certain important sectors – e.g., in Lagonoy - no farmers / fisherfolk; none from poorer/ far-flung barangay; attendees mostly from poblacion
     o Presence of non-marginalized/ non-neutral groups – e.g., municipal employees association, BHWs, day care workers, homeowners association
     o Absence of BDC VCs in San Antonio (late communication of JMC?)
   • Qualitative aspects of CSO participation in CSO Assembly
   • Selection of CSO reps in LPRAT and CSO signatories
   • Output of Poverty Situation Analysis, including application of evidenced-based planning
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

2. Quality of participation of CSO assembly
   ▪ Qualitative aspects of CSO participation in CSO Assembly
     o CSO reps in FGDs report:
       ✓ Feeling free to speak and of being listened to for the first time
     o FGDs suggest importance of prior preparation of CSOs – some came ready with list of projects they have pre-identified as a group; suggest need for CSOs to prepare prior to CSO assembly
     o FGDs suggest a greater degree of awareness/understanding of and ability to articulate the needs of communities as well as overall sense of empowerment in some KC munis (e.g., Las Nieves, San Antonio)
       • May be attributed to amount of social preparation in KC areas
       • Some variation evident as well – between graduates and current participants and among current participants in KC
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

2. Quality of participation of CSO assembly
   - Selection of CSO reps in LPRAT and CSO signatories – followed JMC in all but one study site (i.e., Gumaca where all attendees to CSO assembly allegedly included as members of LPRAT but ...)
     - One vote per attendee – 8 out of 11 study sites
     - One vote per sector – Buenavista, Hinigaran, Sagay
       ✔ Helps ensure that no one sector unduly influence results of the selection process because of sheer numbers (this objective can also be achieved through federation of CSOs belonging to same sector)
2. Quality of participation of CSO assembly

Quality of Poverty Situation Analysis

- What is output of PSA?
  - Identification of problems & solutions/ strategies in a generic sense (e.g., San Antonio, Butuan, Libmanan, Buenavista)
  - Identified problems, solutions/ strategies and specific projects (e.g., Las Nieves, Goa, Lagonoy, Cauayan, Sagay City)

- Application of evidenced-based planning
  - Not evident that data even when available is used in identifying problems, and solutions/ strategies
    - Lack of data
    - Outdated data (e.g., most of CBMS)
    - Ineffective use of data (e.g, RBI in Sagay)
  - “common felt” needs – might be reasonable in context of KC but might be problematic in non-KC areas
3. Quality of output of LPRAP workshop

- Provenance of long list of projects considered
  - Is there reference to list prepared during the CSO assembly?
  - Is list prepared during LPRAP WS itself?

- Who prepares long list of projects?
  - “Technocratic” approach – MPDC made list using problem tree analysis and CBMS data essentially by herself (Gumaca)
  - Only CSOs prepared long list of projects (Las Nieves, Butuan & Goa)
  - LGU and CSOs separately proposed their own list of projects and these were later combined
  - LPRAT break-out groups organized along sectoral lines composed of LGU officials and CSOs who jointly come up with their list – typically discussion here appear to be dominated by LGU reps who are more articulate (e.g., Lagonoy)
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

3. Quality of output of LPRAP workshop
   ▪ Who participated in prioritization process
     o LPRAT members during LPRAP WS
     o ELDC in plenary (Las Nieves, Libmanan)
       ✓ Approach can be unwieldy/unmanageable in munis with many barangays
       ✓ Approach may yield poor outcomes in “failed” KC areas (e.g., Libmanan)
         • BDC VCs reportedly “volunteered” by BDC chair
         • Note that even in successful KC areas, BDC chair and BDC VCs would tend to vote together because they would tend to have common appreciation of needs of their barangays given KC CEAC process
     o All CSO reps who attended LPRAP WS (including those who were not elected members of LRPAT) - Butuan
Breaking down this thing called CSO participation

3. Quality of output of LPRAP workshop
   - How was project prioritization done?
     - Each LPRAT member asked to rank long list of projects and projects with highest “score” gets top priority
     - Open but unstructured discussion
     - Divide equally
### Extent of CSO participation

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<tr>
<th>Province/Region</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
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<th>BDC VC-identified %</th>
<th>LGU-identified %</th>
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- **Summary indicator of CSO participation** – share of projects identified by CSOs/BDC VCs in total cost of LPRAP projects for FY 2015
- **Variation in share of CSO/BDC-VC in total cost of LPRAP projects** – due to differences in more intermediate indicators of CSO participation (including local political interference in a number of elements of areas)
Lessons learned

What went wrong in Mauban?

- Only LGU accredited CSOs were invited to CSO assembly
- CSOs’ lack of trust in LGU – CSOs not aligned with LGU opted out
- No PSA done in CSO assembly
- Evidence of weak/ unprepared CSO during project prioritization in LPRAP WS
  - Projects size proposed by CSOs below the floor
  - CSOs merely “confirmed” proposals made by LGU department head during unstructured discussion in LPRAP WS – weak, unprepared CSOs
- CSO signatories – includes Barangay Nutrition scholar and a CSO rep who substituted for a municipal employee
Lessons learned

What went wrong in Gumaca?
- Technocratic approach of MPDC from PSA during CSO assembly and LPRAP prioritization – how something right can go so wrong
- Some selectivity on CSOs invited to the CSO assembly

What went wrong in Buenavista?
- Most CSO leaders who attended CSO assembly were aligned with Mayor – this trumped some of the good elements present in municipality like:
  - Open invitation
  - CSO presenting its own contribution to long list of projects (although this list did not come from CSO assembly itself)
  - Ranking of projects in long list to prioritize
Lessons learned

What went wrong in Libmanan?

- Self-exclusion of some CSOs from the process due to trust issues
- BDC VCs appointed by BDC chairs (due to lack of citizen / community “volunteers”)
- Project prioritization process done by entire ELDC
  - Unwieldy because muni has 75 barangays
  - BDC VCs voted with BDC chairs, etc.
Lessons learned

What went right in Las Nieves?

- Open invitation
- LGU initially did not propose any projects for inclusion in long list of projects
- Empowered BDC VCs and CSO reps are able to stand up to local officials – when LGU tried to propose eco-tourism project during project prioritization with entire ELDC; said proposal was voted down
- However, equal sharing of BUB budgets (“divide by N” approach to project prioritization) – somewhat of a letdown
Lessons learned

What went right in Butuan City?

- Open invitation
- CSOs allowed to propose their own list of projects for consideration
- Although project prioritization was done in unstructured manner, it was not evident that LGU reps dominated discussion – CSOs appear to be fairly strong

What went wrong in Butuan City?

- Conduct of post-LPRAP validation workshop which effectively changed the list of BUB projects in LPRAP so as to be able to include mayor’s pet project
Lessons learned

It could have been worse in Cauayan

- Were it not for the vigilance of the CSO reps every step of the way

It could have been better in San Antonio

- If BDC VCs were allowed to participate in BUB process given their impressive commitment and understanding of needs of their barangays coming out of the KC CEAC process
- Had the mayor himself not facilitated the LPRAP workshop (the intervention of mayor in LPRAP WS in Goa had similar effect)
Overview of presentation

- Background/ objective of study
- Findings
  - Conclusions
Overall assessment of BUB process & participation

- Primary value of BUB process to LGU officials
  - Increased fiscal space for LGUs by providing them with an additional source of funding for LGU projects
Overall assessment of BUB process & participation

- BUB adds value to project identification and prioritization process
  - BUB process better enables LGUs to get information directly from the sectors whose needs and concerns are typically not considered and addressed in regular LGU planning and budgeting processes.
  - **Looking at the cup half full** - Despite the fact that not all of the projects that were actually included in the LPRAP are identified by CSOs/ BDC vice-chairmen, BUB process helps ensure that some of the projects that are needed from the perspective CSOs and local communities are able to secure some funding under the BUB.
Overall assessment of BUB process & participation

- **BUB adds value to CSO participation in planning at local level**
  - CSO participation in the LDC is typically limited to 25% of its total membership.
  - Although the LGC provides that NGOs shall choose their representatives to the LDC from among themselves, large degree of political interference in their selection
    ✓ venue and processes governing said selection of CSO representatives to the LDC is not well spelled out in the LGC
    ✓ CSO membership in the LPRAT is 50% compared to 25% in the LDC
    ✓ Role of LDC typically limited to “approving” plans (i.e., LDP, AIP) prepared by LGU officials
  - However, little evidence that the processes installed in the BUB are actually integrated/adopted in the regular development processes of the LGU
Overall assessment of BUB process & participation

- BUB adds value to CSO empowerment
  - By giving the CSOs the opportunity to identify government projects that will improve their lives, BUB process has encouraged the basic sectors to organize themselves, and to become more active in LGU affairs.
  - Also, provides venue for building CSO capacity through learning by doing.
Overall assessment of BUB process & participation

- BUB adds value to LGU-CSO relations
  - The BUB provides a more structured avenue for LGU-CSO interaction.
    - BUB provides LGU and CSOs with a venue to engage in open discussions and joint decision-making
    - BUB process has helped strengthen the relationship between the local government and the CSOs.
    - Process tends to build more trust between CSO and LGU
Overall assessment of BUB process & participation

- BUB adds value to inter-CSO relations
  - Some of the respondents in the KII and FGDs have pointed out that CSOs tend to focus on projects that benefit their sector, if not their specific organization only.
  - However, there is some evidence that situation is slowly changing as more CSOs are becoming open and supportive of other CSOs, by pushing for the interest of sectors other than their own.
[ Thank you ]

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